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Abstract
A general equilibrium model of international trade with heteroge-
neous firms, under the assumption that the distribution of produc-
tivity across firms is Pareto, delivers systematically different power
law exponents for exporting and non-exporting firms. In this setup,
the presence of international trade systematically affects the firm size
distribution to make it more heavy-tailed. This model predicts that
the power law exponent for exporters should be strictly lower in ab-
solute value than the power law exponent for non-exporters. Follow-
ing the propositions made in the literature, we estimate the power
law exponent for a large sample of Turkish firms. We also question
the applicability of the OLS regression in the context of power law
estimation and provide maximum likelihood estimates, which have
been proven to be consistent and efficient in this context. Along
with the maximum likelihood estimates, we also provide the CDF
and ln(Rank−1/2)− ln(size) estimates. Our results provide support-
ing evidence for the theoretical predictions, according to which the
distribution of firm size has heavier tails due to exporting behaviour.
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1 Introduction
Power law distributions appear in a diverse range of natural and man-made
phenomena. Firm sizes [3; 11], population of agglomerations [24], the fre-
quency of occurence of unique words in any human language, the sales volume
of bestseller books, the intensities of solar flares, personal annual incomes [5]
among many other phenomena have been considered to follow power law
distributions, taking the form Pr(X > x) = Cx−α, where Pr(X > x) is
the probability that a random variable X is greater than x, α the scaling
parameter and C some constant.
The literature on firm size distribution have shown that, the probabil-
ity density is described by a straight line on a log-log scale, with a slope of
(approximately) −2, i.e. a power law distribution with the scaling parame-
ter equal to 1 [3]1, [11]2. However, the deviations from the power law form
occur for very small and very large sizes. On closer inspection, the straight
line mentioned above is actually somewhat concave. It is also reported that
the empirical density can be described quite well by a log-normal density
function[15; 14; 21]. However, Quandt (1966) [22] and Sutton (1997) [20]
both argue that the empirical density cannot be decently described either by
a power law nor by a log-normal.
The empirical literature on firm size distribution taking into account the
impact of international trade is not very vast. Eaton et al. (2011) [8] use
a detailed data on the exports of French manufacturing firms. They use a
variant of Melitz-Chaney model to explain the systematic regularities that
1[3], using Census data, finds a power law with exponent α = 1.059± 0.054.
2Using a representative sample of French firms, [11] find an α of 1.017± 0.032.
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they observe in the data. Core elements of their model are that firm pro-
ductivity distribution is Pareto (as in [16; 6]), demand is Dixit-Stiglitz, and
markets are separated by iceberg trade barriers and require a fixed cost of
entry. In order to overcome the discrepancies between the empirical facts
and the model, they introduce market and firm-specific heterogeneity in en-
try costs and demand and an increasing marketing cost to reach additional
consumers in each country as in Arkolasis (2008) [1]. One of their findings
is that the size distribution of exporters in a given foreign market is Pareto,
after a certain minimum threshold. They also find that the most productive
firms serve markets with higher fixed costs of exporting. Eaton et al. (2011)
[8] use the method of simulated moments and find an α of 1.46± 0.10.
Arkolasis (2008) develops a dynamic trade model with product differenti-
ation, heterogeneous productivity firms, and increasing marginal market pen-
etration costs. Assuming that there is a continuous entry of firms at a certain
rate and productivities of entrants evolve according to a geometric Brownian
motion, the model endogenously generates a right tail cross-sectional Pareto
distribution of firms’ productivities. The cross-sectional predictions of his
model for the distribution of domestic and exporting sales of firms are con-
sistent with firm-level data [1].
di Giovanni et al. (2011) [11] estimate the power law coefficient for a
large sample of French firms, taking explicitly into account the impact of
international trade. Using the Melitz (2003) model and assuming the dis-
tribution of firm productivities is Pareto, they show that the power law ex-
ponent for exporting firms is different and lower (in absolute value) than
that for non-exporting firms. Using linear regression methods, they find esti-
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mates of the power law exponent for exporting firms, which are systematically
lower than that for non-exporting firms (α = 0.94± 0.042 for exporters and
α = 1.055 ± 0.011 for non-exporters.). In order to obtain reliable estimates
for α, they propose two methods: first one consists in estimating the power
law exponent for non-exporters only and second one, estimating α using the
domestic sales data for all firms. This is the approach followed in this paper.
The precise value of the scaling parameter matters in various contexts.
For example, Gabaix [9] argues that many economic fluctuations are not
due to small diffuse shocks that directly affect every firm; instead idiosyn-
cratic shocks to large firms potentially generate nontrivial aggregate shocks
that affect macroeconomic variables. He shows that if the firm size distri-
bution has thin tails, i.e. α>2, then the GDP volatility decays according
to 1/
√
N (where N is the number of firms in the economy); however, if the
firm size distribution has fat-tails, i.e. α<2, then the GDP volatility de-
cays as 1/N1−
1
α , much more slowly than 1/
√
N . This means that, when the
firm size distribution is fat-tailed, idiosyncratic shocks to individual firms
will have a nontrivial aggregate effect, opposing the simple diversification
argument where aggregate fluctuations should have a size proportional to
1/
√
N . di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) [12] takes the issue further and
finds that openness to international trade can have an impact on aggregate
fluctuations by increasing the relative importance of large firms and thus
making the economy more granular.3 Another reason why empirical power
law estimates are important is that they can be used to pin down crucial
parameters (such the elasticity of substitution between goods) in calibrated
3An economy is said to be granular, that is the idiosyncratic shocks to firms result in
aggregate fluctuations, if the distribution of firm size follows a power law with a scaling
parameter sufficiently close to 1 in absolute value.
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heterogeneous firms models and that quantitative results often depend very
sharply on the precise parameter values that govern the distribution of firm
size [11].
In the literature, the most frequently used method for estimating the
power law coefficient (i.e. the scaling parameter) is linear regression. Be-
cause the power law takes the form Pr(X > x) = Cx−α, taking the log of
both sides gives lnPr(X > x) = −α lnx− lnC, which is a straight line, with
a slope of α. A line is then fitted to the data by OLS to find the scaling
parameter. However, it is argued that this approch has some drawbacks.
First, because, some of the assumptions of the OLS method are not fulfilled
when used for estimating a power law model. Second, this approach does
not allow us to test formally the plausibility of the power law for the data in
question. Here, we will use the maximum likelihood estimation and test the
plausibility of the power law hypothesis in order to get consistent estimates,
following the methods proposed by [7], thus avoiding the drawbacks of the
OLS method. Merely for the sake of comparison of our empirical findings
with those of other studies, we have nonetheless recourse to two linear re-
gression methods.
In this paper, we aim to provide accurate estimates of power law param-
eters for Turkish firms, taking into account the exporting behaviour, imple-
menting a principled statistical framework to quantify and test the power
law model in empirical data, following [7; 11]. The paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical framework, and show how
the scaling parameter is affected when international trade is taken into ac-
count. In Section 3, we analyze the linear regression method in power law
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estimation and highlight its limitations; then describe the estimation (MLE)
and testing procedure of the power law hypothesis. In Section 4, we describe
the data and present the empirical methodology. In Section 5, the results
are presented. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we will describe the analytical power law relationship in the
distribution of firm size, employing the Melitz (2003) model [18]4. We as-
sume that the distribution of firm productivities is Pareto. Melitz (2003) [18]
develops a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms to analyze the
intra-industry effects of international trade. He adds firm level heterogeneity
in productivity to the classical framework of Krugman (1980), assuming that
firms differ in terms of marginal productivity of labour; that the productiv-
ity of each firm is randomly drawn from a distribution and that firms do not
know their productivity prior to starting production. He also assumes an ice-
berg type of variable cost of exporting. In this setup, he shows that exposure
to trade leads to the entry of the more productive firms in the export market
(because of the presence of a fixed cost of entering foreign markets, only a
subsection of firms will be able to export), while the less productive firms
continue to serve the domestic market and the least productive firms exit.
In this model, the more productive the firm, the more markets it serves and
has larger size (earns larger profits), thus we expect the firm size distribution
to have a heavier upper tail and thus, a Power law exponent that is lower in
absolute value, when compared to the non-exporting firms.
4This section draws heavily on [11]
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Demand
A continuum of firms produces a unique CES variety, using the labour factor,
the only factor of production. Given the mass of varieties Jn supplied to the
market, the consumer’s utility function in market n is
max
[∫
Jn
c
ε−1
ε
ni di
] ε
ε−1
and the income constraint is,
∫
Jn
pnicnidi = Yn,
where cni denotes the consumption of good i in country n, pni is the price
of good i in country n, Yn is total expenditure in the economy, and Jn is the
mass of varieties supplied in country n. These goods are substitutes, which
imply 0< ε−1
ε
<1 and an elasticity of substitution between any two goods of
ε>1. By maximizing the utility subject to the income constraint, we can
calculate the market demand for the variety i as a function of its price:
cni =
Yn
P 1−εn
p−εni , (1)
where Pn denotes the ideal price index in economy n, Pn =
[∫
Jn
p1−εni di
] 1
1−ε
.
Supply
For each country, there is a pool of prospective entrants into the industry,
which is denoted by I¯n. Each potential entrant produces a unique CES vari-
ety. There are both fixed and variable costs of production and trade. A firm
i ∈ [0, I¯n] at birth draws a productivity parameter from a common distribu-
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tion and learns its type, that is, its marginal cost ai. The production and
the export decision for each firm in country n occur after observing ai. If a
firm decides to produce, it has to pay the fixed cost of setting up production,
denoted by f ; if it decides to export, it has to pay the fixed cost of exporting,
denoted by κmni. The price of the input bundle for country n is ωn. Technol-
ogy is linear in the input bundle: to produce one unit of output, a firm with
a marginal cost ai requires ai units of the input bundle, i.e., if there is only
one input, labour, then the cost of the input bundle is the wage ωn = wn. Al-
ternatively, in an economy with both labour and capital and a Cobb-Douglas
production function, the cost of the input bundle is ωn = w
α
nr
1−α
n , where rn
is the return to capital in country n. Regardless of its productivity, each firm
faces a residual demand curve with constant elasticity ε given by equation
(1) and thus chooses the same profit maximizing markup equal to ε
ε−1 , and
sets its price as:
pni =
ε
ε− 1ωnai
and supplies a quantity equal to,
Yn
P 1−εn
[
ε
ε− 1ωnai
]ε
and earns revenues from domestic sales, Di:
Di =
Yn
P 1−εn
(
ε
ε− 1ωnai
)1−ε
which is obtained by substituting pni =
ε
ε−1ωnai into equation (1) and recog-
nizing that revenue Di = pnicni. (Note that firm’s revenues fall with ai.)
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Decision to supply
We define Di = Mn × Bi where Mn ≡ YnP 1−εn
(
ε
ε−1ωn
)1−ε
is a measure of the
size of the domestic demand, and Bi ≡ a1−εi is the firm-specific productivity
term. The total variable profits are a constant multiple of Di:
piVD(ai) =
Di
ε
The zero cutoff profit condition requires that, given firm i’s draw of produc-
tivity, ai, the firm will only choose to supply if its variable profits cover the
fixed cost of setting up production, that is if piVD(ai) ≥ f . Firms drawing
a productivity level allowing them to make nonnegative profits will supply;
otherwise, they will not supply. (This cutoff also determines the set of goods
supplied to the market.) Now, we can define the minimum firm size, which
is observed in this economy as: D = εf and the marginal cost above which
the firm will not operate:
ann =
(
Mn
εf
) 1
ε−1
Exporting from country n to country m involves additional fixed and
variable costs5: to export from country n to country m, a firm i has to pay
the fixed cost of exporting, κmni which is firm-variant, and a per-unit iceberg
transport cost of exporting τmn>1. An iceberg transport cost of exporting
greater to unity indicates that τ units of a good must be shipped in order
5[18] points out the evidence that the firms incur not only in per-unit costs such as trans-
port costs and tariffs, but also in significant fixed costs associated with market research,
adaptation of the product to the foreign standards, setting up distribution channels, etc.
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for 1 unit to arrive at destination. The consumer in country m also maximizes
max
[∫
Jm
c
ε−1
ε
mi di
] ε
ε−1
s.t. ∫
Jm
pmicmidi = Ym,
which is identically symmetric to the consumer in country n. Given the
demand in country m cmi =
Ym
P 1−εm
p−εmi and the marginal cost equal to τmnωnai,
the firm i in country n charges the profit maximizing price pmi =
ε
ε−1τmnωnai
and earns export revenues Xi given by:
Xi =
Ym
P 1−εm
[
ε
1− ετmnωnai
]1−ε
m’s market size that is faced by the firm i in country n is:
M∗m ≡
Ym
P 1−εm
[
ε
1− ετmnωn
]1−ε
and the variable profit from exporting is given by M
∗
mBi
ε
and the exporting
decision (the export cutoff) is thus based on:
M∗mBi
ε
≥ κmni (2)
The fixed cost of exporting is stochastic and varies for each firm, so each
firm will have different export profit values, above which they decide to ex-
port. The free entry condition and the zero cutoff profit condition identify
a unique average productivity level and an average profit level. The equilib-
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rium average productivity level determines in turn, the export productivity
cutoff as well as the average productivity levels and the ex ante successful
entry and export probabilities. The free entry condition and the aggregate
stability condition ensure that the aggregate payment to the labour used for
investment equals the aggregate profit level. Thus, the aggregate revenue
remains exogenously fixed by the size of the labour force. The average firm
revenue is determined by the zero cutoff profit and free entry conditions,
which pins down the equilibrium mass of incumbent firms, which determines
in turn, the mass of variety available in each country. Here, we do not aim
to solve the model; we will only derive the analytical power law relationship
described in [11] using this model.
2.1 Power Law in Firm Size in Open and Closed Econ-
omy
In this section, we will first demonstrate that firm sales Si follow a power law
in a closed economy, where the firm productivity is Pareto and then describe
the two mechanisms (which are analyzed in [11]) by which exporting flattens
the distribution and makes it more fat-tailed in the presence of international
trade.
Firm sales, Si follow a power law, if the number of firms with a size Si
greater than a value s is proportional to 1
sα
for some positive α, that is:
Pr(Si>s) = Cs
−α, α>0. (3)
As in [11], we assume that Bi follows a Pareto distribution with exponent
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α, which amounts to the same thing as assuming that firm productivity is
Pareto in this setup. Let us assume that firm productivity is given by 1
a
∼
Pareto(b, θ), and its cumulative distribution function by: Pr
(
1
a
<y
)
= 1− b
y
θ
.
In autarky, it can be written:
Pr(Si>s) = Pr(Di>s)
= Pr(MnBi>s)
= Pr
(
a1−εi >
s
Mn
)
= Pr
((
1
a
)ε−1
>
s
Mn
)
= Pr
(
1
a
>
(
s
Mn
) 1
ε−1
)
Pr(Si>s) = (b
ε−1Mn)
θ
ε−1 s
θ
ε−1 (4)
Here, C = (bε−1Mn)
θ
ε−1 and α = θ
ε−1 , so we can write Si =Pareto
(
bε−1Mn, θε−1
)
.
Our next step is to analyse the power law relationship in presence of in-
ternational trade. There are two mechanisms, proposed by [11], which allow
to explain the flattening of the distribution due to the exporting behaviour.
The first mechanism is based on the hierarchy of firm productivities: the
more productive the firm, greater the number of foreign markets it serves
(entry into progressively more foreign markets). The second mechanism pro-
posed by [11] is based on stochastic export costs that vary by firm, allowing
them to obtain a number of analytical results about the distribution of firm
sizes, which is affected systematically by exporting behaviour.
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Mechanism 1. For simplicity, we assume that the fixed cost of export-
ing is same for each firm i, i.e. κmni = κmn, ∀i. From equation (2), we can
deduce that, each firm will have different number of foreign markets to serve,
given its productivity draw. A firm in market n will first serve the markets
with lowest τmn and κmn (that is the closest markets), high Ym (markets with
larger size), and high P 1−εm (high prices/ lower competition). When we order
the firms according to their productivity (marginal cost), we will see that the
firms with the highest productivity serve m number of markets (if we assume
m to be the number of world markets in total), and the firms with the next
highest productivity level will serve m− 1 number of markets and the firms
with the lowest productivity will serve the domestic market and so on.
An ordering of firms in this fashion (see Figure 3) implies different power
law exponents for exporting firms than that of non-exporting firms: the slope
of the power law is constant and equal to θ
ε−1 for non-exporting firms (equal
to the autarky exponent). But for exporting firms, the CDF is systemat-
ically and parallely shifted upwards, due to the additional export markets
they serve. That is, the more productive the firm, greater the number of
markets it serves, and more fat-tailed the distribution becomes (see Figure
2).
Mechanism 2. For conveniency, we assume there is only one export
market m. We define φ as the ratio of the foreign market size relative to the
domestic one:
φ ≡ M
∗
m
Mn
= τ 1−εmn
Ym
Yn
(
Pn
Pm
)1−ε
The exporting decision (2) can be rewritten as a function of domestic sales
(and omitting the subscript mn from κmni):
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φDi
ε
≥ κi
We define an export probability function H(x): a firm with domestic sales
Di exports with probability H(Di), which is weakly increasing with Di.
H(x) = Pr
(
κi ≤ φx
ε
)
Export sales Xi can now be rewritten as:
Xi = M
∗
mBi = φDi
and
Xi =
 0 if
φDi
ε
<κi; probability 1−H(Di)
φDi if
φDi
ε
≥ κi; probability H(Di).
(5)
Recalling that Si = Di +Xi, total sales Si can be written as:
Si =
 Di if
φDi
ε
<κi; probability 1−H(Di)
(1 + φ)Di if
φDi
ε
≥ κi; probability H(Di).
(6)
Proposition 2.1 The densities of domestic sales Di, export sales Xi and
total sales Si are given by:
pD(x) = kx
−α−11x>D
pX(x) = Kx
−α−1H
(
x
φ
)
1x>φD (7)
pS(x) = kx
−α−1
[
1−H(x) +H
(
x
1 + φ
)
(1 + φ)α
]
1x>(1+φ)D+kx
−α−11D<x<(1+φ)D
(8)
where k = αDα, K is a constant ensuring
∫
pX(x)dx = 1, and 1{.} is the
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indicator function which is equal to 1 if the statement in the brackets is true
and else zero.
This proposition implies that the distributions of total sales and export
sales are systematically different due to the presence of exporting behaviour,
under the assumption that the productivity distribution is Pareto. So, fit-
ting a simple power law equation to the total sales data, whose theoretical
distribution is described in (8) will be misleading. The common practice of
fitting a power law on total sales will give incorrect estimates for α, which is
in turn used to calibrate the parameter combination, θ
ε−1 .
Proof: From (5), the probability of exports conditioned on domestic sales
Di is:
P (Xi>0|Di) = H(Di)
We assume that the distribution of baseline sizes is:
pD(x) = kx
−α−11x>D (9)
where k is an integration constant, k = αDα.
We next calculate the distribution of exports. We calculate the expected
value of g(X), an arbitrary function. First, given (5),
E[g(Xi)|Di] = (1−H(Di))g(0) +H(Di)g(φDi)
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Hence,
E[g(Xi)] = E[E[g(Xi)|Di]]
= E[(1−H(Di))g(0) +H(Di)g(φDi)]
=
∫
D
(1−H(D))g(0)pD(D)dD +
∫
D
H(D)g(φD)pD(D)dD
E[g(Xi)] =
(∫
D
(1−H(D))pD(D)dD
)
g(0)
+
∫
x>0
(
H
(
x
φ
)
pD
(
x
φ
)
1
φ
)
g(x)dx (10)
Equation (10) implies that x has a point mass
∫
D
(1 − H(D))pD(D)dD on
X = 0, and a density H
(
x
φ
)
pD
(
x
φ
)
1
φ
for x>0. Hence, the density associated
with the restriction of the exports to X > 0 is
pX(x) = k
′pD
(
x
φ
)
H
(
x
φ
)
1
φ
for a constant k′ such that
∫
x>0
pX(x)dx = 1. Given Equation (9),
pX(x) = Kx
−α−1H
(
x
φ
)
1x>φD
for a constant K = k′φαk. We can calculate the distribution of Si using a
similar approach. From Equation (6), with same reasoning as for exports
gives:
pS(x) = pD(x)(1−H(x)) + pD
(
x
1 + φ
)
H
(
x
1 + φ
)
1
1 + φ
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With the Pareto specification for D:
pS(x) = kx
−α−1
[
1−H(x) +H
(
x
1 + φ
)
(1 + φ)α
]
1x>(1+φ)D
+ kx−α−11D<x<(1+φ)D (11)
We see a Pareto shape in the tails, but modulated by the export probability
function H.
We will now present an auxiliary prediction. Suppose that the distribution
of fixed exporting cost κi is Pareto, with an upper cut: H
(
x
φ
)
= k′′xβ, for
x<x∗ and some k′′, and H
(
x
φ
)
= k′′(x∗)β for x>x∗. Then, from Equation
(7), we deduce that the distribution of export sales is given by:
pX(x) ∝
 x−α−1+β for x<x∗x−α−1 for x ≥ x∗.
and the scaling parameter of X is given by:
αX(x) =
 α− β for x<x∗α for x ≥ x∗.
When H has a high slope, the power law exponent of X is lower than that
of domestic sales, i.e. when the fixed cost of exporting is high (the selection
effect will be stronger), there will be fewer small exports; and when the H
function saturates, the power law exponent of exports converge to α, that is
the exponent for domestic sales (see Figure 4).
In this section, we have explained the two mechanisms by which the scal-
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ing parameter for exporting firms is systematically lower (in absolute value)
than that for non-exporting firms. In the next sections, we will test whether
the data is in accord with the theoretical findings.
3 Estimating and Testing a Power Law Dis-
tribution
In this section, we will discuss how a power law distribution should be fitted
to the empirical data in an accurate way and how to test whether a power
law hypothesis is plausible for the data in question. Many studies in the lit-
erature use different estimation and hypothesis testing methods, and in some
cases the plausibility of the power law hypothesis is not formally tested. The
method most employed in determining the power law exponent is graphical
analysis of the log of the ranked data or a frequency histogram of the data,
followed by a least-squares linear regression. However, it is argued by many
studies that OLS estimates are subject to systematic and potentially large
errors and some other serious problems; and that maximum likelihood esti-
mation produces more accurate and unbiased estimates than does the OLS
method [7].
3.1 Linear regression and power law
In the literature, the scaling parameter is usually inferred by fitting a straight
line fit to: (i) the slope of a log-transformed histogram, (ii) the slope of a
histogram with logarithmic bins (increasing bin widths), (iii) the slope of
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the CDF calculated with constant width bins, and (iv) the slope of the CDF
calculated without any bins. Usually, the R2, the fraction of explained vari-
ance, is reported as an indicator of the quality of the fit; and the standard
error of the slope estimate as a measure of the uncertainty of the scaling
parameter. These approaches are unreliable as the assumptions underlying
the least-squares regression do not hold.
An OLS estimation based on the plot of the empirical probability dis-
tribution pˆ(x) on a double-logarithmic scale systematically underestimates
the power law exponent because of the sparseness of data in the tail of the
distribution. To deal with the lack of data points in the tail of the empirical
distribution, two methods are employed in the literature: logarithmic binning
and estimating the empirical cumulative distribution Pˆ (x), instead of pˆ(x):
(i) Logarithmic binning reduces the noise in the tail of the empirical distri-
butions pˆ(x) and Pˆ (x) by merging data points into groups. As a consequence
of binning, the width of the distribution of the estimate is reduced. (An im-
portant drawback of this method is that binning throws away information.)
(ii) Estimating the CDF, which is less sensitive to the noise in the tail of
the distribution, gives much better estimates for the exponent.6 However,
all graphical methods have a common serious flaw: When OLS estimates are
derived, it is assumed that the standard deviation of the distribution of the
error in yi is the same for all data points (xi, yi) [7]. Here, this is not the
case, which causes the following limitations:
All graphical methods for estimating the scaling parameter are based on a
linear least squares fit of some empirical data points (x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xM , yM)
6It should be noted that this method is inefficient, because the values are not indepen-
dent and the inferential assumptions for the OLS regression fail.
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to the equation
y(x) = ao + a1x.
The linear least squares fit minimizes the residual
M∑
i=1
uˆ2 =
M∑
i=1
(yi − a0 − a1xi)2
Estimates aˆ0 and aˆ1 for the parameters a0 and a1 are given by:
aˆ1 =
∑M
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)∑M
i=1(xi − x¯)2
and
aˆ0 = y¯ − aˆ1x¯
Derivation of the parameter estimates are based on several assumptions re-
garding the data points (xi, yi): it is assumed that there are no statistical
uncertainties in xi, but yi may contain some statistical error. The errors
in different yi are independent and identically distributed random variables
with zero mean and the standard deviation of the errors is independent of xi
[23]. However, these conditions are not fulfilled for various graphical meth-
ods for estimating the scaling parameter (i.e. the empirical values are highly
correlated and the statistical variation in the values is not constant, but in-
creases rapidly with the degree, which is caused by the logarithmic nature of
the plot and the decreasing probabilities [17].)
1. Calculation of standard errors
The exact normality of the OLS estimators hinges crucially on the nor-
mality of the distribution of the error in the population. If the errors are
random draws from some distribution other than the Gaussian, the OLS es-
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timates will not be normally distributed, which means that the t statistics
will not have t distributions and the F statistics will not have F distribu-
tions. This is a potentially serious problem because our inference hinges on
being able to obtain p-values from the t or F distributions. When we per-
form a linear regression on the logarithm of a histogram, the error will not be
Gaussian (though independent): The error in the frequency estimates p(x)
themselves is Gaussian, but the error in their logarithms is not: for ln p(x)
to have Gaussian fluctuations, p(x) would have to have log-normal fluctua-
tions, which would violate the central limit theorem[7]. Thus, the ordinary
formula for the calculation of the standard error of the estimate is in this
case incorrect and not applicable.
When we consider the case of fitting a straight line to a CDF, the error
in the individual values P (x) is Gaussian (since it is the sum of indepen-
dent Gaussian variables), but the error in the logarithm is not. Moreover,
the independency assumption is violated, since the statistical errors in yi are
not independent any more (i.e. the adjacent values of the CDF are highly
correlated, because P (x) = P (x + 1) + p(x))[4]. CDF fits are empirically
more accurate for determining α, however this is not due to the fact that
the assumptions of the linear regression are valid, but because the statistical
fluctuations in the CDF are much smaller compared to those in the PDF.
The standard error on the scaling parameter becomes smaller, but this does
not mean that the estimate of the error is better; it is smaller because of the
failure to account for correlations [4].
2. Validation Using R2 as an indicator of the quality of fit may in most
cases be misleading. We may observe many different distributions, which
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seem to follow a power law over some of their range, such as the log-normal
or the streched exponential, and which may both give quite high R2 values,
but are indeed not power law distributions. Even when the fitted distribution
approximates a power law quite poorly, we may still observe high R2 values,
since the fit accounts for a significant fraction of the variance. Although,
we should note that a small R2 may be informative and may allow us reject
the power-law hypothesis. But, in most of the cases, a low R2 will rarely be
encountered, therefore it will tell us nearly nothing about the goodness-of-fit
of a power law[7].
3. Regression lines are not valid distributions The PDF must in-
tegrate to 1 over its defined range, however this constraint is not taken into
account by the OLS regression, thus the regression line will not respect this
constraint[7].
3.2 Maximum likelihood estimation
Maximum likelihood method is a more reliable approach than the graphical
methods mentioned above. Suppose that f(x;α) denote the probability den-
sity function of a random variable x, conditioned on a single parameter α.
The joint density of n independent and identically distributed observations
from this process is the product of the individual densities:
p(x1, ..., xn;α) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi;α) = L(α;x1, ..., xn)
The joint density is the likelihood function, defined as a function of the
unknown parameter, α, where x1, ..., xn is used to indicate the collection of
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sample data. For mathematical convenience, the logarithm of the likelihood
function is maximized, as its maximum is in the same place:
lnL(α;x1, ..., xn) =
n∑
i=1
ln p(xi;α)
The maximum likelihood estimator of α is that value of α that maximizes
the sample likelihood function, L. We maximize the log-likelihood function
by differentiating it with respect to the unknown and equating the resulting
derivative to zero. The resulting value of the estimator is called the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator. Under some regularity conditions, the maximum
likelihood estimator has the following asymptotic properties[13]:
1. Consistency: plim αˆ = α (where α is the true unknown parameter)
2. Asymptotic normality: The estimator αˆ is asymptotically normal with
mean α and variance (α−1)
−2
n
.
3. Asymptotic efficiency (no consistent alternative with less variance): αˆ
is asymptotically efficient and achieves the Cramer-Rao lower bound
for consistent estimators.
4. Invariance: If αˆ is the maximum likelihood estimator for α, and if g(α)
is any transformation of α, then the maximum likelihood estimator for
g(α) is g(αˆ).
Maximum likelihood estimators for the power law
We derive the maximum likelihood estimator for the power law distribution
p(x) = α−1
xmin
(
x
xmin
)−α
, where α is the scaling parameter and xmin indicates
the threshold value above which the distribution obeys a power law. We will
calculate the unknown parameter α in such a way that the probability of
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observing the sample values is maximized. Given p(x) and assuming that
the observations are independent and identically distributed, we can write
the likelihood function for xi ≥ xmin:
p(x;α) =
n∏
i=1
α− 1
xmin
(
xi
xmin
)−α
This probability is called the likelihood of the data given the model. The
convention is to work with the logarithm of the likelihood function:
L = ln p(x;α) = ln
n∏
i=1
α− 1
xmin
(
xi
xmin
)−α
=
n∑
i=1
[
ln(α− 1)− lnxmin − α ln xi
xmin
]
= n ln(α− 1)− n lnxmin − α
n∑
i=1
ln
xi
xmin
.
(12)
Differentiating L with respect to α and equating to zero, we obtain the
maximum likelihood estimator for α:
αˆ = 1 + n
[
n∑
i=1
ln
xi
xmin
]−1
. (13)
The standard error on αˆ, which is derived from the width of the likelihood
maximum is
σ =
αˆ− 1√
n
+O(1/n) (14)
where the higher-order correction is positive[7].
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Estimating the lower bound on power law behaviour
The power law is rarely encountered over the entire range of real-world phe-
nomena and usually is not a good description for smaller values of the variable
of interest. We can easily see that p(x) = Cx−α diverges when x tends to
zero, so we expect that a distribution follows a Power law only in its up-
per tail, after a certain minimum threshold xmin. Beyond this minimum
threshold, the distribution deviates from the Power law. Thus, to obtain an
accurate estimate of the scaling parameter, we need to ignore any observation
below this lower bound. If we choose too low an xmin, then the estimate of
the scaling parameter will be biased, since we are trying to fit a power law
model to a non-power-law data. Again, if we choose too high an xmin, then
we will be losing observations, that actually fall into the power law branch of
the distribution, thus increasing the statistical error on the scaling parameter.
In the literature, the most employed methods for choosing xmin are: (i)
to infer visually the point beyond which the PDF or CDF of the empirical
distribution becomes straight on a log-log plot, (ii) to plot αˆ as a function of
xmin and identify the point beyond which the value appears stable.
The method proposed by [7] is as follows: we choose the xˆmin that makes
the probability distributions of the measured data and the best-fit power
law model as similar as possible above xˆmin. For quantifying the distance
between two probability distributions, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
statistic, which is the maximum distance between the CDFs of the data and
the fitted model:
D = maxx≥xmin |S(x)− P (x)|
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where S(x) is the CDF of the data for the observations with value at least
xmin, and P (x) is the CDF for the power-law model that fits the data best
above xmin. Then, xˆmin is the value of xmin that minimizes D. [7] find that
the KS method gives good estimates for xmin.
7
Testing the power law hypothesis
In the literature, the plausibility of the power law hypothesis is often
tested in a qualitative way. If the data seems to be roughly straight on a log-
log plot, or if a high R2 is obtained, then one asserts that the data obey power
law. However, this method may be misleading, as it may allow non-power-
law distributions to be tagged as power-law distribution. In order to test the
plausibility of the power law hypothesis, we use the method described in [7]:
we sample synthetic data sets from a true power-law distribution, measure
how far they fluctuate from the power-law form, and compare the results
with similar measurements on the empirical data. If the empirical data set
is much farther from the power-law form than the synthetic ones, then the
power law is not a plausible fit to the data. This method employs the KS
statistic as a measure of the distance between the distributions8. The intu-
ition behind this method is that we need to distinguish the deviations due
to the random nature of the sampling process from those that occur due to
the non-power-law nature of the data.
7This method works also better than the the Bayesian information criterion method,
where the maximum of the BIC with respect to the xmin gives the estimated value xˆmin[7].
8It should be noted that, a non-power-law process may happen to generate a data set
that is close to a power law, in which case this test will fail. However, the probability of
this happening decreases with the sample size. See [7].
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More precisely, we wish to know whether the power law hypothesis is
plausible, given the data at hand. [7] use a goodness-of-fit test, which gener-
ates a p-value that quantifies the plausibility of the hypothesis. The distance
between the distribution of the empirical data and the hypothesized model
is compared with the distance measurements between the synthetic data sets
and their own power-law fits. Then, the p-value is computed as the fraction
of the synthetic distances that are larger than the empirical distance. In this
case, if the p-value is large (close to 1), then we may say that the difference
between the empirical data and the power-law model are solely due to sta-
tistical fluctuations; if the p-value is small, then we say that the power-law
model is not a plausible fit for the observed data.
The procedure is as follows: first, a power-law model is fitted to the
empirical data using the methods for estimating the lower bound and the
scaling parameter explained above, then the KS statistics is calculated. Sec-
ond, a large number of synthetic data sets are generated, which are drawn
from a power law distribution with the exact same scaling parameter and
lower bound as the distribution that best fits the observed data. Then, the
KS statistic for each synthetic data set and its individual power-law fit is
calculated. Finally, the p-value is calculated as the fraction of the time the
resulting statistic is larger than that for the empirical data.
The generation of the synthetic data set in [7] is as follows: Suppose that
the observed data set has ntail observations for x ≥ xmin and n observations
in total. With probability ntail/n, a random number xi is drawn from a power
law with a scaling parameter αˆ and x ≥ xmin; with probability (n−ntail)/n,
they select one element uniformly at random from among the elements of
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the observed data set that have x ≤ xmin and set xi equal to that element.
Repeating the process for all i = 1, . . . , n they generate a complete synthetic
data set that follows a power law above xmin but has the same non-power-law
distribution as the observed data below xmin.
How many synthetic data sets to generate depends on how much accurate
we want our p-values to be. If we wish our p-values to be accurate within
about  of our p-value, then we should generate at least 1
4
−2 synthetic data
sets [7]. Here, we have generated 1000 such synthetic data sets, so in our
case  = 0.0158.
Finally, following [7], we rule out the power law hypothesis if p ≤ 0.1.
However, it should be noted that, even if we obtain a high p-value, we can-
not tell with absolute certainty that the power law is the correct distribution
for the data. First because, there may well be other distributions that fit
the data better than the power law, and second, when we have small n, it
is harder to rule out the power law hypothesis; so a high p-value may be
due to small n, in which case it should be treated with caution. In order
to compare with alternative distributions, [7] propose using Vuong’s Test to
make a direct comparison between models and decide which one fits better.
If this gives inconclusive results, then we should look at theoretical factors
(take into consideration the industry dynamics for example) to make a sen-
sible judgment about which distributional form is more reasonable.
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4 Data and Empirical Methodology
4.1 Data description
The analysis is carried out with a large dataset of Turkish firms for 2009.
The dataset is constructed using domestic sales data extracted from the An-
nual Industry and Service Database and export sales data from the Foreign
Trade Database, both collected and provided by Turkstat for the year 2009.
The agricultural sector is excluded from the dataset. For firms having more
than 20 employees, full enumeration; for firms having less than 20 employees,
sampling method is used. In total, the dataset includes 99.921 firms, which
constitutes about 4% of the total number (2.483.300) of active firms. The
number of exporting-firms is 14.231. The summary statistics are given in
Table 13.
The power law model is usually not a good description for the data below
some minimum threshold. So, we need to find the minimum threshold above
which the power law model fits well to the data. In the literature, the most
common method for this is just to look at the empirical cumulative distri-
bution (or the PDF) by eye, and decide a minimum cutoff after which the
plot becomes more or less linear. Another method is to plot the estimated α
as a function of the minimum threshold and locate the point beyond which
the estimated α appears relatively stable. Here, we use the method pro-
posed by [7] to estimate the minimum threshold: we choose the value of xˆmin
that makes the probability distribution of the empirical data and the best-fit
power law model as similar as possible above xˆmin. The measure used in
order to quantify the distance between the CDFs of the data and the fitted
model is the KS statistic: D = maxx≥xmin |Pˆ (x) − P (x; ˆalpha, xˆmin)| So the
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threshold estimate corresponds to the value of xmin that minimizes D:
xˆmin = argminxmin max
x≥xmin
|Pˆ (x)− P (x; αˆ, xˆmin)|
However, this method may be criticized for its somewhat circular reasoning:
we use the goodness-of-fit of a power law model to identify the threshold
which maximizes the ability of the power law to describe the data. Be that
as it may, we use this method to estimate the minimum threshold, as we
do not have a better option. The resulting minimum threshold may not be
relevant economically, so we will not load it any economic meaning. This
threshold is approximately TL9 30.000.000, it may be less or more depend-
ing on the considered dataset.
We estimate the power law using different samples: (i) First, we estimate
the scaling parameter for all firms, without making a distinction between
exporters and non-exporters and without omiting the non-tradeable sectors.
(ii) Second, we take into account the exporting behaviour, for the whole
sample. (iii) We estimate the scaling parameter using domestic sales only,
for all firms. (iv) We repeat the same steps for only manufacturing firms.
(v) We omit the non-tradeable sectors and estimate the power law for the
remaining sample. (vi) We estimate the scaling parameter for exporters and
non-exporters at sector-level.
9Turkish Lira
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4.2 Empirical Methodology
Here, we use three different methods to estimate the scaling parameter. In
addition to MLE, we also use the standard methods that are common in the
literature in order to compare our findings with other studies. (i) First, we
use the maximum likelihood method. We estimate the parameters xmin and
α of the power law model using the method explained in section 3.2. Sec-
ond, we calculate the goodness-of-fit between the data and the power law by
generating many synthetic data sets from a true power-law distribution and
measuring how far they fluctuate from the power-law form and finally com-
paring the results with similar measurements on the empirical data. Based
on the resulting p-value, we decide whether we may or may not reject the
plausibility of the power law hypothesis.
(ii) The second method is based on [3]. We regress the natural log of the
complementary cumulative distribution function on the natural log of sales:
lnPr(Si>s) = ln(C)− α ln(s) (15)
(iii) As the third method, we use the log-rank-log-size estimator proposed
by [10], where they modify the regression with a shift of 1/2 (which they find
to be as the optimal shift) in order to reduce the bias related to the OLS
procedure. Accordingly, we rank firm sizes (sales) from largest (rank 1) to
smallest (rank n), and denote their sizes as S(i). Then, we regress
ln(i− 0.5) = ln(C) + αˆ ln(S(i)) + ui (16)
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The standard error of the scaling parameter is given by
√
2
n
αˆ[10].
5 Results
In order to compare our findings with other empirical studies in the litera-
ture, we first do not consider exporting behaviour and do the analysis for all
firms, using the three methods explained above (MLE, CDF, log-rank-log-
size) to estimate the scaling parameter. The estimates are reported in Table
6. We see that our findings differ only slightly from those of [3] and [11]: [3]
finds an α of 0.994 for U.S. firms, and [11] finds 1.017 for French firms (both
with the CDF method), whereas we find an α of 1.072. The MLE delivers an
estimate of 1.0271± 0.0186. Our results for each three method are presented
graphically in Figure 5.
In Table 6, we give the p-value for the power-law model, which gives a
measure of how plausible the power law is as a fit to the data. Here, the
p-value is 0.2140 and passes the threshold of 0.10, but it should be noted
that it is still questionable whether the power-law fit is the best fit. In order
to say that the power law is the best fit, one has to compare among alter-
native distributions (such as the log-normal or the streched exponential), for
example using Vuong’s Test described in [7]. When we look at the plots
taken respectively from [3] and [11] in Figure 12, we can see that there are
some deviations in both tails, even though they are somewhat masked due
to the binned nature of the data. However, in our plots (see Figure 5) the
deviations from the power law in the upper tail are clearly visible, which
raises some questions about the plausibility of a power-law model for firm
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size distribution. We will not go further on this issue for now; as we want
to investigate whether the theoretical findings discussed in Section 2.1 are
verified by the data.
The estimates of the scaling parameter for exporting and non-exporting
firms are reported in Table 9. We easily see that, for each estimation method,
the scaling parameter for exporting firms are lower (in absolute value) than
that for non-exporting firms, i.e. the distribution of exporting firms is sys-
tematically more fat-tailed than the distribution of the non-exporting firms,
which is consistent with the theoretical findings. We also find that the scaling
parameter estimate for the overall sample (all firms) fall between the esti-
mates for exporting and non-exporting firms, which is exactly as we expect.
The results are presented graphically in Figure 7. The CDF of the exporting
firms has a lower slope and is above the CDF of the non-exporting firms,
which means that at each size cutoff, the number of the exporting firms is
greater than the number of non-exporting firms (See Figure 6). As is already
indicated in Section 2.1, we expect power law to be a bad fit for the exporting-
firms sample, because of the deviations caused by the exporting behaviour.
The p-value for exporting-firms sample is 0, so the power law model for ex-
porters can be firmly ruled out. However, the p-value for non-exporting firms
is 0.4880, and power law model seems satisfactory for non-exporters. Again,
it should be noted that this does not mean that the power law is the best fit
for the data and that one has to compare among the competing distributions.
The maximum likelihood estimates of scaling parameter in total sales,
based on only manufacturing firms and only tradeable sectors are given re-
spectively in Tables 7 and 8. When we take international trade into account,
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we obtain similar results. The scaling parameter for exporters is lower in
absolute value than that for non-exporters, for both the manufacturing firms
and the tradeable sample. Also, the p-value for exporters in tradeable sectors
is also lower compared to the p-value for non-exporters.
As discussed in Section 2.1, we expect the scaling parameter for export-
ing firms to converge to the scaling parameter for non-exporting firms, as we
increase the lower cutoff. This would be the case either because all the most
productive (thus bigger) firms have entered all world markets or because the
stochastic fixed exporting costs have an upper bound, above which all firms
export. We have tested this finding by estimating the scaling parameter for
exporters while moving the lower cutoff upwards. Figure 10 shows the scal-
ing parameter estimates as a function of the lower cutoff. We see that the
scaling parameter estimates increase with the lower sales cutoff, which is in
line with the theoretical findings.
We have also estimated the power law in firm size for exporting and non-
exporting firms at the industry level. Table 10 reports the relevant maximum
likelihood estimates. Given the theoretical findings, we expect the results to
exhibit the same pattern at the industry level, as at the aggregate level. In-
deed, we observe that for each sector, the scaling parameter for exporters is
smaller than that for non-exporters. Therefore, it is verified that exporting
behaviour produces the same effects at industry-level, as at aggregate level.
Also in line with the theory, we expect to see greater deviations in the
scaling parameter of sectors that are more open to trade. We test this pre-
diction in the following way: We first estimate the power law in all sales and
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in domestic sales for each sector. Then, we calculate the percentage devi-
ation for each sector, that is, the difference between the scaling parameter
for domestic sales and for total sales of all firms for each sector. We then
plot this against the overall sector openness, that is, the ratio of exports to
total sales. As can be seen in Figure 11, the difference between the power
law exponent for domestic sales and that for total sales increases with over-
all sector openness. To demonstrate the same prediction, we have done the
same exercise considering the difference between the scaling parameter for
non-exporting firms and that for all firms. Again, we plot this against the
overall sector openness and find similar results: The percentage deviation
in the scaling parameter increases with sector level openness. These results
support the theoretical findings, according to which international trade sys-
tematically changes firm size distribution to make it more heavy-tailed.
6 Conclusion
In Section 2.1, we show that α, in autarky, the scaling parameter of the power
law is equal to θ
ε−1 , where θ is the productivity distribution parameter (recall
that Pr
(
1
a
<y
)
= 1 −
(
b
y
)θ
) and ε is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties. This has led researchers to use the estimates of α to determine
θ
ε−1 . For example, [6] analyses the sensitivity of trade flows to trade barriers,
using θ
ε−1 . He measures this as the regression coefficient of the log of rank
on the log of sales (using Compustat data on US listed firms). [16] estimate
the dispersion of firm size to capture the within-industry firm heterogeneity
using total sales data. However, as is showed in Section 2.1, the presence of
international trade alters the firm size distribution and the estimated α no
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longer equals θ
ε−1 . Fitting a power law model on total sales, without taking
international trade into account delivers too low estimates for α. In order
to get correct estimates for θ
ε−1 , [11] propose two methods. The first one is
to estimate α for non-exporting firms only, where theoretically α does cor-
respond to θ
ε−1 . The second method they propose is to estimate the scaling
parameter using the domestic sales for all firms, since the domestic sales obey
power law with the θ
ε−1 exponent.
Using the methods proposed in [11] and a large sample of Turkish firms,
we have estimated the scaling parameter with three different estimation
methods (MLE, CDF and log-rank-log-size). We have underlined the limi-
tations of the OLS estimation when used for power law estimation and how
MLE avoids these pitfalls. Following [7], we have also implemented a formal
method to test the goodness-of-fit of a power law model for our data, and
obtained a p-value of 0.2140 (for all firms, total sales) which exceeds the
critical p-value 0.10. Therefore, we do not reject the power law hypothesis
for firm size distibution. The p-values for the non-exporting and export-
ing firms are respectively 0.4880 and 0, which is consistent with the theory:
Since exporting causes changes in the probability density, the simple power
law describes the distribution of exporters slightly less well. However, the
p-values exceeding 0.10 should be treated with caution. This does not mean
that the power law model is the best description for the data in question and
it still needs to be checked with Vuong’s Test which competing distribution
(for example, log-normal or streched exponential) is a better fit for the data
[7]). Since the main objective of this paper is not whether the power law
provides the best description or not, we did not go further on this issue.
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The main results of the paper are the following: taking the presence of
international trade into account, we have obtained estimates for the scaling
parameter for exporters and non-exporters separately. We did this for the
aggregate economy, for only manufacturing firms, for only tradeable sectors
and at sector-level and systematically obtained lower scaling parameters for
exporting firms, compared to non-exporting firms, for each different sample
considered. This means that exporting behaviour produces the same effects
at sector-level as at the aggregate level. We have also found a positive rela-
tionship between the deviations in the power law parameter (the difference
between the power law exponent for domestic sales and that for total sales)
and sector-level openness (the ratio of exports to total sales in the sector),
which is consistent with the theory. All these findings provide support for
the prediction that international trade systematically changes the firm size
distribution to make it more fat-tailed and that ignoring the presence of in-
ternational trade yields estimates that are too low.
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A An Overview of the Turkish Industry
Turkish economy is characterized by the prevalence of SMEs, which account
for approximately 99% of the total number of firms, 76.7% of total employ-
ment, 26.5% of investment and 10% of exports [2]. According to the Annual
Industry and Service Statistics, 95, 62% of firms are micro (1−9 employees),
3, 78% small (10− 49 employees), 0, 50% medium (50− 249 employees) and
0, 10% are large-scale (250+ employees). An average SME has 3 employees,
whereas the large-scaled businesses have 735. In Turkey, SMEs are charac-
terized by their slow growth, low innovation levels, difficulties in accessing
finance and new markets, and they lack skilled labour [2]. All these factors
are counted among the obstacles to their upsizing.
The GDP and employment shares of the main sectors (as of 2011) are
given in Table 1. The low share of industry in GDP is attributed to the
failure of industrial policies implemented between 1950 − 1975. The failure
of these import substitution industrialization policies have led to an import
dependent industry. Turkey has also suffered from low levels of funding
for R&D activities due to lack of political support and lack of resources to
support the proper development of science and technology policies. The evo-
lution of the share of R&D expenditures in GDP is given in Table 4 (EU-27
average is also given for comparison). Despite the increasing trend, it is still
quite low compared to EU-27. This problem manifests itself in the technol-
ogy structure of exports, which is given in Table 3.
Table 2 presents the main indicators for Turkish manufacturing industry
for the period 1998 and 2011. The share of manufacturing industry in GDP
was around 23.55% on average for the period considered. We observe that
42
Table 1: GDP and Employment Shares of Main Sectors (%), 2011
Share in GDP Share in Employment
Agriculture 9.2 25.5
Industry 26.9 19.5
Services 63.9 55.1
Source: TURKSTAT
the share of the manufacturing industry in exports has increased, however,
the low-tech sectors’ share continued to remain dominant (see Table 3. This
is mostly due to the low levels of R&D expenditures.
Atiyas et al. (2010)[2] argue that labour productivity and total factor
productivity contribute little to growth in the Turkish economy. Rodrik [19]
finds that the total factor productivity growth was negative between 1990 and
2003, while the labour productivity growth was positive and of 0.9%. Rodrik
[19] reports the labour productivity growth between 1999− 2005 as 5%, and
that the 40% of this growth is due to the allocation of labour force between
sectors. As seen in Figure 1, the differential in productivity levels (value
added per unit of labour) between agriculture and manufacturing industry is
significant (it would make better sense to make a comparison between agricul-
ture and manufacturing, since the utilities industry is capital-intense). As it
is observed, the average productivity of manufacturing is almost three times
greater than that of agriculture. With such huge productivity differentials,
we may conclude that an allocation between sectors will result in nontrivial
productivity gains.
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Figure 1: Inter-industry productivity differentials, 2008 [19]
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Table 3: Technology Structure of Manufacturing Industry Production and
Exports (%)
Technological intensity
Turkey EU Exports
Production Exports
2000 2002 2005 2000 2002 2005 2003
High 5, 9 5, 1 6, 3 7, 8 6, 2 6, 0 21, 5
Mid-High 22, 5 18, 2 25, 3 20, 4 24, 3 28, 5 41, 9
Mid-Low 30, 4 26, 7 27, 0 20, 5 22, 8 26, 9 15, 9
Low 41, 2 50, 0 41, 4 51, 3 46, 8 38, 7 20, 7
Total 100, 0 100, 0 100, 0 100, 0 100, 0 100, 0 100, 0
Source: State Planning Organization, Ninth Development Plan (2006)
Table 4: Total R&D Expenditure as % of GDP
Turkey EU-27
2000 0.48 1.86
2001 0.54 1.87
2002 0.53 1.88
2003 0.48 1.87
2004 0.52 1.83
2005 0.59 1.83
2006 0.60 1.85
2007 0.72 1.85
2008 0.73 1.92
2009 0.85 2.01
2010 0.84 2.00
Source: State Planning Organization, Ninth Development Plan (2006)
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Table 5: Average TFP and Labour Productivity Growth, %
TFP Growth Labour Productivity Growth
1960− 1980 1.75 3.2
1980− 1990 1.45 2.5
1990− 2003 −0.70 0.9
Source: [19]
B Tables
Table 6: Power Law in Firms Size, All Firms
MLE CDF ln(Rank − 0.5)
α 1.0271 1.072 1.072
s.e. (0.0186) (0.00100) (0.02150)
R2 - 0.9957 0.9953
No. of firms 5071(±655) 5113 5114
p-value 0.2140 - -
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the power law exponents in firm size (total sales), using the three
methods described in the text. Column (1) reports the MLE estimate given in Equation (13). Column (2)
estimates the CDF of the power law specified in Equation (15). Column (3) regresses the ln(i − 0.5) of
the firm size distribution on the log of its size, i.e., ln(S(i)). The p-value quantifies the plausibility of the
power law hypothesis, the critical value is 0.10 (bold if statistically significant).
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Table 7: Power Law in Firms Size, Manufacturing Firms
All firms Exporting firms Non-exporting firms
α 0.8711 0.8018 1.2020
s.e. 0.0453 0.0953 0.0870
ntail 3066± 902 1956± 833 1306± 528
n 10760 6233 4527
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01
Notes: This table reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the power law exponents in firm size (total
sales), for manufacturing firms. The p-value quantifies the plausibility of the power law hypothesis, the
critical value is 0.10 (bold if statistically significant). ntail represents the number of observations above
the estimated minimum threshold xmin and n is the total number of firms in each sample.
Table 8: Power Law in Firms Size, Tradeable Sectors
All firms Exporting firms Non-exporting firms
α 1.0376 0.9341 1.3500
s.e. 0.0453 0.0598 0.0525
ntail 3066± 902 2075± 676 1400± 388
n 27368 12023 14942
p-value 0.1741 0.00 0.9456
Notes: This table reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the power law exponents in firm size (total
sales), for firms in tradeable sectors. The p-value quantifies the plausibility of the power law hypothesis,
the critical value is 0.10 (bold if statistically significant). ntail represents the number of observations
above the estimated minimum threshold xmin and n is the total number of firms in each sample.
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Table 11: Power Law in Firms Size, All Firms, Domestic Sales Only
MLE CDF ln(Rank − 0.5)
α 1.0425 1.081 1.081
s.e. (0.01634) (0.001) (0.023)
R2 - 0.9960 0.9956
No. of firms 5071(±655) 4370 4371
p-value 0.1180 - -
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the power law exponents in firm size (domestic sales), using the
three methods described in the text. Column (1) reports the MLE estimate given in Equation (13). Column
(2) estimates the CDF of the power law specified in Equation (15). Column (3) regresses the ln(i− 0.5) of
the firm size distribution on the log of its size, i.e., ln(S(i)). The p-value quantifies the plausibility of the
power law hypothesis, the critical value is 0.10 (bold if statistically significant)
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Table 13: Summary Statistics,
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. of Firms Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All Firms
Total Sales 40.077 28.799 249.145 1000 2.0896E + 7
Non-Exporting Firms
No. of Firms Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Sales 27.048 1.5828E + 04 1.0204E + 05 0.1 8.6252E + 06
Exporting Firms
No. of Firms Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Sales 13.029 5.5727E + 04 4.1010E + 05 0.1 2.0896E + 07
Export Sales 14.231 7.4014E + 03 7.7543E + 04 0.1 4.6835E + 06
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation.
Sales figures are in thousand of Turkish Liras. Firms with total sales less than TL1.000.000
have been removed from the sample.
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C Figures
Figure 2: The Analytical Power Law in the Melitz-Pareto Model: Multiple
Export Markets [11]
Figure 3: Partition of Firms[11]
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Figure 4: The Analytical Power Law in the Melitz-Pareto Model: Stochastic
Export Entry Costs[11]
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Figure 5: Power Laws in the Distribution of Firm Size, All firms
(a)
(b)
(c)
Notes: This figure reports the estimated power laws in firm size (total sales) for all firms, using the three
methods described in the text: MLE (Panel (a)), the CDF (Panel (b)) and the log-rank-log-size estimation
(Panel (c)).
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Figure 6: Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms
Notes: This figure reports the estimated power laws (using the CDF method) in firm size (total sales) for
exporting and non-exporting firms separately.
Figure 7: Power Laws in the Distribution of Firm Size, Exporting and Non-
exporting Firms
(a)
(b)
Notes: This figure reports the estimated power laws in firm size (total sales) for exporting and non-
exporting firms separately. The maximum likelihood estimation is used. Exporting-firms are shown in
Panel (a), non-exporting firms are shown in Panel (b).
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Figure 8: Power Laws in the Distribution of Firm Size, Manufacturing Firms
(a)
(b)
(c)
Notes: This figure reports the estimated power laws in firm size based on total sales, all manufacturing
firms (Panel (a)), exporting (Panel (b)) and non-exporting manufacturing firms (Panel (c)), using the MLE
method.
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Figure 9: Power Laws in the Distribution of Firm Size, Tradeable Sectors
(a)
(b)
(c)
Notes: This figure reports the estimated power laws in firm size based on total sales, for firms in tradeable
sectors (Panel (a)), exporting (Panel (b)) and non-exporting manufacturing firms (Panel (c)), using the
MLE method.
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Figure 10: Power Law Coefficient for Exporting Firms
Notes: This figure depicts the estimated scaling parameter, αˆ for exporting firms, plotted against the
minimum threshold.
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Figure 11: Deviations in Power Law Estimates and Openness at Sector-Level
(a)
(b)
Notes: This figure plots the differences between the power law exponents at sector level against overall trade
openness. In Panel (a), the percentage difference between the power law exponent estimated on domestic
sales and the power law exponent estimated on total sales, i.e.,
αdom−αtotal
αdom
is given on the y-axis. In
Panel (b), the percentage difference between the power law exponent estimated on all sales for non-exporting
firms, and the power law exponent estimated on total sales of all firms, i.e.,
αnonexporting−αtotal
αnonexporting
is given
on the y-axis Trade openness at sector level, i.e., the ratio of exports to total sales in the sector is given on
the x-axis for both panels. The hollow dots represent the tradeable sectors, whereas the full ones represent
the non-tradeable sectors.
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Figure 12: CDF Plot for U.S. Firms (Axtell 2001, on the left) and French
Firms (Di Giovanni et al. 2010, on the right), Binned Data
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